Taste or statistics? A correspondence study of ethnic, racial and religious labour market discrimination in Germany by Koopmans, Ruud et al.
www.ssoar.info
Taste or statistics? A correspondence study
of ethnic, racial and religious labour market
discrimination in Germany
Koopmans, Ruud; Veit, Susanne; Yemane, Ruta
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Koopmans, R., Veit, S., & Yemane, R. (2019). Taste or statistics? A correspondence study of ethnic, racial
and religious labour market discrimination in Germany. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 42(16), 233-252. https://
doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1654114
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-71403-9
Taste or statistics? A correspondence study of ethnic,
racial and religious labour market discrimination in
Germany
Ruud Koopmans, Susanne Veit and Ruta Yemane
WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT
In this study we compare rates of discrimination across German-born applicants
from thirty-five ethnic groups in which various racial and religious treatment
groups are embedded, this study allows us to better distinguish taste and
statistical sources of discrimination, and to assess the relative importance of
ethnicity, phenotype and religious affiliation as signals triggering discrimination.
The study is based on applications to almost 6,000 job vacancies with male
and female applicants in eight occupations across Germany. We test taste
discrimination based on cultural value distance between groups against
statistical discrimination based on average education levels and find that
discrimination is mostly driven by the former. Based on this pattern, ethnic,
racial and religious groups whose average values are relatively distant from the
German average face the strongest discrimination. By contrast, employers do
not treat minority groups with value patterns closer to Germany’s different
from ethnic German applicants without a migration background.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 8 February 2019; Accepted 1 August 2019
KEYWORDS Ethnic discrimination; taste-based and statistical discrimination; field experiment; race and
religion; value distance; education levels
Introduction
Large numbers of correspondence studies have investigated labour-market
discrimination against ethnic, religious and racial minorities (see e.g. the
reviews by Bertrand and Duflo 2017; Rich 2014; Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016).
In such studies, researchers send out comparable applications of fictitious can-
didates to real job openings but vary the characteristics of interest (e.g.
gender and ethnicity). Different response rates (commonly referred to as “call-
back”) provide causal evidence of discrimination (for overviews, see Gaddis
2018; Neumark 2016; Pager 2007). Across a wide range of countries, minority
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groups and labour-market segments, these studies have demonstrated that
candidates with the same observable productivity-relevant characteristics
are nonetheless treated differently, thus proving the existence of labour-
market discrimination beyond a reasonable doubt.
Correspondence studies have been much less successful, however, in iso-
lating the reasons behind discrimination. Studies in Germany (Kaas and
Manger 2012; Schneider, Yemane, and Weinmann 2014) have for instance
shown that Turkish ethnics are discriminated, but it remains unclear
whether this discrimination is based on assumptions about the average
group productivity of Turkish ethnics or on anti-Turkish preferences void of
any productivity-relevant empirical basis. Moreover, what triggers anti-
Turkish biases? Is it a general anti-immigrant or pro-German bias that
Turkish applicants suffer as much as other immigrant groups? Or is it some
specific bias? And if so, is this related to their presumed Muslim religion or
to phenotypical differences?
Answering such questions is crucial because discrimination rates vary
strongly across ethnic (Oreopoulos 2011), racial (Quillian et al. 2017), pheno-
typical (Saeed, Maqsood, and Rafique 2019) and religious groups (Wright
et al. 2013). In this paper, we use an innovative research design that includes
thirty-five ethnic groups and different racial phenotypes and religious affilia-
tions to analyse patterns of hiring discrimination in Germany. We test hypoth-
eses about statistical and taste discrimination by analysing to what extent
discrimination patterns vary with education levels or with cultural value differ-
ences across ethnic, racial and religious groups.
Taste-based and statistical discrimination
The literature distinguishes two fundamentally different sources of discrimi-
nation: preferences (taste-based discrimination) and productivity concerns
(statistical discrimination) (e.g. Guryan and Charles 2013 or Neumark 2016).
Taste-based discrimination (Becker 1957) refers to bias that is unrelated to
productivity concerns. If employers prefer working with majority members,
they will invite them more often to job interviews than minorities. Employees
or customers may have preferences for working with or being served by
members of the majority group even when the employer has no such prefer-
ence herself.
Statistical discrimination (Aigner and Cain 1977; Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972),
by contrast, is related to productivity concerns. Information contained in job
application materials is an imperfect signal of an applicant’s true productivity
and therefore employers, who have no personal experience with candidates,
may additionally rely on signals of group membership that are not intrinsically
causally related to unobserved productivity but that are empirically correlated
with it. Such signals may include age and gender, but also race, ethnicity, or
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religion. If an employer must choose between two candidates with equivalent
observable skills, he may choose the candidate belonging to a group with
higher average productivity on the assumption that the unobserved pro-
ductivity component is likely to be higher for that candidate.
The distinction between taste and statistical discrimination is not just of
theoretical interest, but also for designing adequate policy responses. If dis-
crimination is taste-based, efficient measures would need to reduce the
anti-minority bias, e.g. by way of anti-racist campaigns or diversity trainings.
By contrast, if discrimination is statistical, discrimination is best combated
by measures aiming at the empirical grounds on which it is based, e.g. by
removing barriers and providing support programmes to increase minorities’
qualifications.
Past studies have tested the hypothesis drawn from theories of statistical
discrimination that providing more information about the individual pro-
ductivity of candidates should reduce the callback gap between ethnic or
racial groups (e.g. Agerström et al. 2012; Baert and De Pauw 2014; Bartoš
et al. 2016; Edo, Jacquemet, and Yannelis 2013). Most studies indeed find
less discrimination when richer information about individual productivity is
provided, but generally, some discrimination remains even under the high-
information treatment. The absence of empirical evidence in support of stat-
istical discrimination or the remaining level of unexplained discrimination is
sometimes interpreted as support for taste-based discrimination. But, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no previous field experiment that directly
tests taste-based discrimination.
At their core, however, theories of statistical and taste discrimination are
not about varying levels of individual information, but about varying assump-
tions or preferences employers have about the groups applicants belong to.
The design of most past correspondence studies does not allow an analysis
of variation on the group level. Studies typically send two applications to
the same vacancy, one by a majority applicant and one by a minority appli-
cant, who in all other respects are equivalent in terms of observable skills.
For instance, many US studies contrast black and white candidates (e.g. Ber-
trand and Mullainathan 2004, Gaddis 2014; Jacquemet and Yannelis 2012),
whereas many European studies have contrasted Arab (e.g. Blommaert, Coen-
ders, and Van Tubergen 2014; Derous, Ryan, and Nguyen 2012) or Turkish (e.g.
Baert et al. 2015; Kaas and Manger 2012) applicants to majority applicants.
This design is perfectly suited to demonstrate the occurrence of discrimi-
nation, but not to determine its causes or to generalize beyond the racial or
ethnic groups studied. Statistical and taste discrimination implies competing
hypotheses about group characteristics, which can never be answered by
dichotomous comparisons of just one minority group to the majority.
However, most designs compare only one minority group to a majority
group. Some compare three (e.g. Pager 2003) or up to five (e.g. Booth,
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Leigh, and Varganova 2012; Oreopoulos 2011) groups, but that gives only
marginally more leverage to test competing hypotheses.
Employers who discriminate draw on signals of group membership to
derive stereotypical assumptions about average characteristics of groups.
These assumptions may have no basis in empirical facts at all or they may
refer to empirically existing differences across groups. In relation to statistical
discrimination, empirically unfounded assumptions about differences in
group productivity have been referred to as “error discrimination” (England
and Lewin 1989). Unlike forms of statistical discrimination based on at least
partly valid assumptions about group differences, error discrimination
lowers the efficiency of hiring decisions because it leads employers to
devalue suitable candidates based on mistaken assumptions about the
groups they belong to. We are not aware of a similar distinction between
different forms of taste discrimination, probably because taste discrimination
is regarded as a form of irrational behaviour per se. From an economic per-
spective, taste discrimination is indeed by definition irrational because it
brings concerns unrelated to productivity into the hiring decision. But from
other than economic perspectives there may be a rationale behind taste dis-
crimination. Sociological studies have revealed strong preferences to interact
with people who are socially and culturally similar (“homophily”, see McPher-
son, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001) – which may extend to the realm of
business and work, since similarity is expected to facilitate communication
and coordination by increasing the likelihood of similar experiences, goals
and preferences (Byrne 1997; Montoya, Horton, and Kirchner 2008).
Hypotheses
In this paper, we consider three signals of group membership: ethnicity,
race and religious affiliation. To derive testable and empirically distinguish-
able hypotheses about statistical and taste discrimination, we assume that
discrimination is at least in part based on existing differences across
groups that can be measured and of which employers have some knowl-
edge. Then we can predict that under statistical discrimination invitation
rates should vary as a function of empirically observable average levels
of productivity-related measures across groups. Similarly, under taste dis-
crimination invitation rates should vary with empirically observable differ-
ences across groups regarding traits related to social and cultural
preferences and tastes. These considerations lead to the following two
hypotheses:
H1 (statistical discrimination): Discrimination is a function of group averages in
productivity-relevant characteristics. The lower the average productivity of a
group, the higher will be the rate of hiring discrimination against applicants
belonging to that group.
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H2 (taste discrimination): The greater the difference between the cultural value
patterns of a group and those of the majority group, the higher will be the
rate of hiring discrimination against applicants belonging to that group.
Data and method
Sample
Our sample consists of 5,819 applications to an equal number of vacancies
advertised across Germany between October 2014 and April 2016 (for more
details see the technical report: Veit and Yemane 2018). We used an unpaired
design in order to accommodate many different treatments (e.g. gender, eth-
nicity, religion and phenotype). The sample includes male as well as female
applicants who were born in Germany, had the German nationality, and
had received their entire education in Germany. Vacancies were drawn
from the website of the Federal German Employment Agency.
We applied to positions in eight medium-skilled occupations that require
formal training. Because the labour market is partly segregated by gender,
four of these were mixed-gender occupations, with roughly similar numbers
of males and females (hotel receptionist, cook, salesperson and industrial
office clerk); two were strongly male-dominated occupations (mechatronics
fitter and plant mechanic for sanitary, heating and air conditioning
systems); and two were strongly female-dominated (medical assistant and
dental assistant). To avoid biases due to the a-typicality of the gender of appli-
cants for occupations that are strongly gender-skewed, we only sent male,
respectively female applications to the four occupations with strong gender
biases (see Online Supplement Table S1).
As is the norm in Germany, our applications not only included a motivation
letter and a CV, but also full copies of vocational training certificates and sec-
ondary school diplomas. Further, it is customary to include letters of reference
from previous employers and, importantly, a photograph of the applicant. The
photo requirement makes it possible to signal racial phenotype directly rather
than using the indirect and imprecise signal of typical minority names (see
Gaddis 2017).
To draw conclusions on the plausible causes of groupdifferenceswe consider
three potentially relevant signals of group membership: ethnicity, race and reli-
gious affiliation. Importantly, since we let these different signals vary indepen-
dently wherever this is empirically plausible, we can tease apart the separate
effects of ethnic, racial and religious signals, which are normally conflated in cor-
respondence studies. Moreover, becausewe substantially increased the number
of ethnic groups in comparison to previous correspondence studies, our design
allows us to apply a multivariate regression approach to test hypotheses drawn
from theories of statistical and taste discrimination.
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Treatments, covariates and dependent variable
Ethnicity
We selected ethnic groups from thirty-four countries of origin as well as a
German comparison group. German and Turkish ethnics each make up a
quarter of the sample, and the remainder is divided among the other thirty-
three groups (see Online Supplement Table S2). Turkish ethnics were over-
sampled to allow comparisons with results of earlier correspondence
studies in Germany (e.g. Kaas and Manger 2012 or Schneider, Yemane, and
Weinmann 2014). Except for the Turkish ethnics, we are not interested in
deriving point estimates for single ethnic groups. The chosen ethnicities
include the largest minority groups in Germany (e.g. Turkish, Bosnian,
Polish, Russian and Italian ethnics) as well as several small and medium-
sized ethnic groups that were selected to obtain enough variation across vari-
ables of interest. We signalled ethnicity in the application documents by
names “typical” for the respective ethnic group, as well as, in the skills
section of the CV, by indicating (in addition to German) a second mother
tongue, e.g. “Luganda (Uganda, mother tongue)” or “English (USA, mother
tongue)” (see for more details Veit and Yemane 2018).
Racial phenotype
Racial distinctions are arbitrary and boundaries fuzzy. Nevertheless, people
racially categorize others and these categories may form a basis for discrimi-
nation. We use the three most widely recognized categories: white, black and
Asian. These categories themselves, of course, contain phenotypical diversity;
we, therefore, captured racial phenotypes by more than one photo. Altogether,
twenty-eight photos were used, fourteen for men and women, respectively. For
the white phenotype, we use six photos for each gender (varying by hair colour
and skin tone), for the black phenotype four photos (varying by skin tone and
hair texture), and for the Asian phenotype also four photos (varying by skin tone
and facial features). We conducted two pre-tests, one for attractiveness and one
on the plausibility of photos referring to members of different ethnic groups
(see Veit and Yemane 2018). Based on the attractiveness pre-test two photos
were replaced by alternative ones. Based on our plausibility pre-test we
excluded implausible combinations of photos and ethnic groups. For instance,
we include black Egyptians and Moroccans, but not black Turks. Online Sup-
plement Table S2 shows which phenotypical treatments were used for each
ethnic group. In addition, Table S4 provides the results of a post-test for the
attractiveness of the final selection of photos.
Religion
Following other studies (e.g. Wallace, Wright, and Hyde 2014) we signalled
religious affiliation by engagement in a voluntary association. For half of
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the sample this engagement was non-religious (referring to a not further
specified social association: “Sozialverein Aktiv e.V.”) and for the other half,
we indicated a religious affiliation (Christian, Muslim, Buddhist or Hindu: e.g.
“Christlicher Sozialverein Aktiv e.V.”). Where possible, we use more than one
religious affiliation within the same ethnic group – using as a cut-off criterion
that at least five per cent of the population of the country of origin must
belong to religion for it to be included as a treatment. We thus replicate on
a wider scale the innovation of using multiple religious backgrounds within
one ethnic group, pioneered by Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2016), Drydakis
(2010), Pierné (2013) and Wright et al. (2013). Online Supplement Table S2
shows which religion treatments were used for each ethnic group. Because
Hindu and Buddhist treatments are only plausible for a small number of
ethnic groups (Hindu for Indians and Trinidadians and Buddhist for Japanese,
South Koreans, Chinese, Vietnamese and Malaysians), we take them together
in the empirical analyses.
Other treatments
Two other treatments that were randomly assigned will be used as control
variables: the inclusion of a reference letter and school grades (see Veit and
Yemane 2018). Half of the sample consists of applications with good grades
whereas the other half has satisfactory grades.
Group-level covariates: education levels and value distance
Level of education
In order to test our hypothesis on statistical discrimination, we relate callback
to education as an indicator of average productivity, using data from the 2012
Mikrozensus1 (a one per cent representative sample of the German popu-
lation). Average levels of education are calculated on a four-point scale (no
education, only primary education, secondary and tertiary education).2
Emancipative values
As an indicator of taste discrimination, we use cultural distance in terms of
emancipative values. We draw on the latest available data on average
values in countries of origin, assuming that differences in values across immi-
grant groups will mirror to some extent those among their countries of
origin.3 We use the emancipative value dimension distinguished in the
World Values Survey and the European Values Survey (see EVS 2015; WVS
2015, and the online appendix of Welzel 2013).4 Instead of the value score
itself, we use the absolute distance to the German score to obtain the value
distance from Germany. Emancipative (vs. obedient) values measure four
domains of emancipative orientations, ranging from support for freedom of
speech and popular influence in national, local and job affairs (voice),
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tolerance towards divorce, abortion and homosexuality (choice), personal
autonomy as desired qualities in child-rearing (autonomy), to gender equality
values (equality; e.g. “On the whole, men make better political leaders than
women do”).
For each covariate, we assume that employers’ assumptions about group
traits are triggered by the combined signals of ethnicity, race and religion.
For instance, we suppose that employers estimate white Christian Egyptians
and black Muslim Egyptians to have certain commonalities because of their
Egyptian ethnic origin, but also to differ because of their different phenotypes
and religions. Ideally, we would, therefore, need statistical data on pro-
ductivity and values for each combination of signals, but the German Mikro-
zensus and the World and European Value Surveys do not provide this level of
detail.
We, therefore, calculated scores for Christians, Muslims and Hindus or Bud-
dhists by averaging over all countries represented in the Mikrozensus and the
World and European Values Surveys with respectively Christianity, Islam and
Hinduism or Buddhism as the dominant religion. In order to arrive at represen-
tative scores for the German context, we first defined for all origin groups in
the Mikrozensus their dominant religion5 and used this data to calculate mean
education scores and emancipative values for each religious group. Thus,
Turkish scores weigh more heavily in the calculation of the Muslim average
than, e.g. Pakistani scores, because there are many times more people of
Turkish than of Pakistani origin in Germany (and thus in the Mikrozensus)
and concomitantly employer stereotypes of “Muslims” in Germany are more
strongly driven by perceptions of Turks than of Pakistani.
We then similarly calculated averages for whites, blacks and Asians across
all nationality groups where the respective race predominates.6 The final
measures used in the analyses represent each intersection of ethnicity, pheno-
type and religion separately, by taking the average of the ethnicity, race and
religion scores to which an applicant belongs. White Christian Egyptians,
therefore, get a different score (based on the average of the white, Christian
and Egyptian scores) than black Muslim Egyptians (based on the average of
the black, Muslim and Egyptian scores). In the no religious signal treatment,
averages are calculated using the score for the dominant religion of the
country of origin. This is justified because preliminary analyses showed that,
for each of the three religious’ groups, there were no significant callback
differences between the no religion treatment and the majority religion treat-
ment (e.g. Egyptians with no religion treatment vs. Egyptians with a Muslim
treatment). Significant callback differences only resulted when an applicant
had a minority religious signal (e.g. Muslim Bulgarians).
To demonstrate that our results also hold when we use more straightfor-
ward measures of education levels and value distance that are directly
taken from the Mikrozensus and the European and World Values Surveys,
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we also show results for simplified measures that vary only across the 35
ethnic groups (rather than the 132 intersections of ethnicity, race and reli-
gion). Online Supplement Table S3 provides the mean values of all group-
level covariates across all groups.
Dependent variable: positive callback
Our dependent variable is a response from employers that indicates an inter-
est in the candidate, which we refer to as “positive callback”. Most of these
were straightforward invitations to a job interview, but the category also
includes responses by email or phone that requested a return call or further
information by email. Negative responses included explicit rejection notifica-
tions, as well as, more often, simply no reply.
Results
Descriptive results
Overall positive callback was fifty-four per cent but varied considerably across
occupations (from twenty-one per cent for industrial office clerks to seventy
per cent for dental assistants) and between males and females (see Online
Supplement Table S1), as well as across ethnic groups. In addition, better
grades have the expected positive effect, but discrimination rates do not
vary significantly across grade levels. Inclusion of a reference letter of the
current employer had no noticeable effect on callback.
Figure 1 shows positive callback rates – across all treatment conditions – for
the 35 ethnic groups. Applicants of German origin received a positive callback
in sixty per cent of the cases. Some ethnic groups had higher callback rates
than German ethnics. This includes people of Spanish, Japanese, Polish and
Swiss origin. Because except for German ethnics and Turkish ethnics the
numbers of cases for specific ethnic groups are quite low (around n = 100),
only the Spanish result (seventy-three per cent positive callback) differs sig-
nificantly from the German callback. Callback rates for Chinese, US Americans,
Romanians, Greeks, Mexican, Vietnamese, Indonesians and South Koreans are
above fifty-five per cent and thus less than five percentage points below those
of German ethnics. All the ethnic groups from Indians (callback rate forty-eight
per cent) downward differ significantly (at p < .05 in linear or logistic
regressions of callback on ethnicity) from German ethnics.
In this category, we also find the Turkish ethnics (callback forty-seven per
cent). The absolute callback difference of thirteen percentage points (forty-
seven per cent vs. sixty per cent) that we find between Turkish and German
ethnics is larger than in the three previous correspondence studies of ethnic dis-
crimination in Germany. However, in relative terms – an almost one third higher
callback rate for German ethnics – our result is comparable to the results reported
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by Weichselbaumer (2016, fourteen per cent vs. nineteen per cent) for Turkish
and German females and by Kaas and Manger (2012, thirty-five per cent vs.
forty per cent) or Schneider, Yemane, and Weinmann (2014: fifteen per cent vs.
twenty per cent) for Turkish versus German males. We find that several ethnic
groups have even lower callback rates than Turkish ethnics: Nigerian, Malaysian,
Iraqi, Ugandan, Pakistani, Dominican, Ethiopian, Moroccan and finally Albanian
ethnics, whose positive callback rate is only forty-one percent.
Callback also varied by religion and race (see Figure 2). Positive callback for
Christian applicants amounted to fifty-seven per cent and was only slightly
lower for applicants without religious signal or with a Hindu or Buddhist signal
(respectively fifty-four per cent and fifty-three per cent; both not significantly
different from the Christian callback rate). Muslims, however, received consider-
ably lower positive callback, at forty-six per cent (significantly different fromChris-
tians and from no religious signal at p < .001, and from Hindus or Buddhists at p
< .10). Applicants with white phenotypes had a positive callback rate of fifty-five
percent, followed by Asians with fifty-three per cent and blacks with forty-nine
percent. The difference between whites and Asians is not statistically significant
but blacks have significantly lower positive callback than whites (p < .01).
What explains these considerable differences? Are they a result of statistical
discrimination and explained by productivity-related group means? Such an
Figure 1. Positive callback by ethnic group.
Note: This figure shows the point estimates and confidence intervals from a linear regression of positive
response on ethnicity. The dashed vertical line highlights the response rate for German job applicants
without foreign roots.
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explanation has a certain degree of face validity. Ethnic groups with high posi-
tive callback rates also tend to have high mean education levels (e.g. Japa-
nese, South Koreans, Chinese, US Americans, Swiss; see Online Supplement
Table S3), and conversely many ethnic groups with low callback rates are
found at the bottom of the educational ladder (e.g. Turkish, Iraqi and Moroc-
can ethnics). Many of these groups that combine low education levels with
low positive callback are predominantly Muslim. However, alternative taste-
based explanations also have face validity. The West European and East
Asian ethnic groups with very high callback rates originate in countries that
are very close to Germany in terms of emancipative values (again, see Table
S3). And conversely, ethnic groups that have low callback such as Pakistani,
Nigerian, Turkish, Ugandan and Moroccan ethnics have values very different
from those prevalent in Germany. Black phenotypes and Muslim religiosity
are disproportionately concentrated in these groups that combine high
value distance with low positive callback.
Multivariate results
Thanks to the design of our study, we can move beyond speculation and
investigate which of the two theories of discrimination has the greatest
Figure 2. Positive callback by religion and phenotype.
Note: This figure shows the point estimates and confidence intervals from two separate linear regressions
of positive response on religion (see the black circles) and phenotype (see the black triangles), respect-
ively. The dashed vertical line highlights the average response rate for German job applicants without
foreign roots.
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explanatory power. To this end, we ran a series of regression models. Because
our observations are nested in altogether 132 different combinations of ethnic
groups, phenotypes and religious signals, we fitted linear mixed-effects
models with random intercepts by these ethnicity-phenotype-religion clusters
(see Gelman and Hill 2006; McCulloch and Neuhaus 2011). Following Hellevik
(2009), we ran linear instead of logistic regressions, which have the advantage
that coefficients are easily interpretable and comparable across models.
Results of alternative model specifications are discussed below in the robust-
ness checks section and shown in Online Supplement Tables S5–S6.
The first column of Table 1 shows the baseline model, which includes the
ethnic origin, racial phenotype and religion treatments as well as all fully
orthogonal treatments and controls (grades, reference letter, gender, occu-
pation and month of application). Turkish ethnics have a nine percentage
points lower likelihood of receiving a positive response than German
ethnics. Other non-German ethnics are – on average – less disadvantaged
than Turkish ethnics, with a response rate that is five percentage points
below the rate for German ethnics. Applicants with black phenotypes have
a positive callback rate that is seven percentage points below the rate for
whites. Finally, for applicants volunteering for a Muslim organization the like-
lihood of a positive response is seven percentage points lower than for Chris-
tian volunteers. All these results are statistically significant. Except for a
significantly weaker penalty of signalling Muslim faith among Turkish immi-
grant compared to other immigrants, there are no significant interactions
between the three types of penalties – ethnic, racial and religious (see
Online Supplement Table S9). The added effects of disadvantaged traits
cumulate in the group of black Muslims of immigrant origin, which the
model predicts to have nineteen percentage points lower callback rates
(see the coefficients of −.05 for other non-German ethnics, −.07 for blacks
and −.07 for Muslims).
In column 2, we test the statistical discrimination hypothesis and investi-
gate to what extent education levels as an indicator of average group pro-
ductivity can explain the observed penalties. The aim of these analyses is
not to increase the overall explained variance. What we are looking for in
these models is whether indicators of group productivity and values absorb
or diminish the effects of ethnic, racial and religious group membership
signals. In line with hypothesis 1, we find a significant effect of average edu-
cation on positive callback. The coefficient of .03 implies that a one standard
deviation increase on the education variable (.21 points on the education
scale) results in 3.5 per cent higher callback. While the education variable
reduces the size of the Muslim treatment effect from −.07 in model 1 to
−.04 in model 2 and the effect of Turkish ethnicity from −.09 to −.04, it
does not reduce the size of the penalty for other non-German ethnics and
for black applicants. The reason is that Turkish ethnics and groups originating
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Table 1. Linear regressions of positive callback on individual-level treatments and group-level covariates.


























.01 (.02) −.01 (.03) −.05 (.02)** −.05
(.02)***







−.02 (.02) −.04 (.03) −.07 (.02)*** −.07
(.02)***
−.06 (.02)** −.07(.02)**
Asian −.01 (.02) −.03 (.02)+ .01 (.02) −.00 (.02) −.01 (.02) −.02 (.02) −.00 (.02) −.02 (.02)
Religion (ref.:
Christian) No
−.01 (.02) −.01 (.02) −.00 (.02) −.00 (.02) −.01 (.02) −.01 (.02) −.01 (.02) −.01 (.02)
Muslim −.07
(.02)**
−.04 (.02)+ −.03 (.02) −.03 (.02) −.07 (.02)** −.06 (.02)** −.05 (.02)* −.04 (.02)+
Hindu or Buddhist −.02 (.03) −.05 (.03) .00 (.03) −.01 (.04) −.02 (.03) −.03 (.03) −.02 (.03) −.03 (.03)
Education level .03 (.01)** .01 (.01) .02 (.01)+ .01 (.01)
Value distance −.04 (.01)*** −.03 (.01)* −.03 (.01)** −.03 (.01)*
CONTROLS
VARIABLES:
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N (groups) 132 132 132 132 35 35 35 35
N (applications) 5,819 5,819 5,819 5,819 5,819 5,819 5,819 5,819
R2 (within) .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08
R2 (between) .17 .21 .22 .22 .47 .49 .55 .55
R2 (overall) .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09
Notes: Table 1 shows the results of random-intercept linear regression models with standard errors clustered at the level of 132 ethnicity–religion–race clusters (models 1–4) and 35
ethnic groups (models 5–8). Group-level covariates are standardized. All models include the following control variables and orthogonal treatments: grades, reference letter, gender,
occupation and month of application.















in Muslim countries more generally indeed have relatively low education
levels. Immigrants from non-Muslim European, Asian and African countries,
however, have quite high average education levels. As a result, education
levels provide a potential explanation for discrimination against Turks and
other Muslims, but not against other immigrant groups.
Next, we test the idea derived from taste-based theories of discrimination
that preferences related to cultural values and norms shape patterns of dis-
crimination. The third column of Table 1 shows that value distance has a
strong impact on discrimination rates. The coefficient of −.04 implies that a
one standard deviation increase in value distance from the white-Christian-
German baseline results in 4.9 per cent lower callback. In this model, all
ethnic, racial and religious penalties are strongly reduced and become statisti-
cally insignificant. We, therefore, find strong support for hypothesis 2 on taste
discrimination based on cultural value differences.
In a final step, we test hypotheses 1 and 2 simultaneously. The results of
model 4 show that the effect of value distance is only slightly reduced and
remains significant, whereas the education effect is strongly reduced and
becomes insignificant. Mediation analyses confirm that value-based taste dis-
crimination explains the pattern of ethnic discrimination much better than
education-based statistical discrimination does (see Online Supplement
Table S11).
In models 5–8 of Table 1 we report results when we use simplified
measures of education levels and value distance that are only calculated
across the thirty-five ethnic groups. Because these do not vary within ethnic
groups across phenotypical and religious signals, they cannot explain the
effects that indicate discrimination based on these signals. Regarding ethni-
city, however, they confirm the results of the main analysis: education levels
do not explain much of the discrimination against Turkish and other non-
German ethnics, whereas value distance explains ethnic discrimination very
well and absorbs the effects of Turkish and other non-German ethnicity
almost entirely.
Robustness checks
To demonstrate robustness, we replicated all multivariate analyses with
different model specifications (see the Online Supplement):
. Using random-intercept logistic regression to account for the binary
dependent variable, we found no meaningful differences anywhere (see
Table S5).
. We weighted all thirty-four non-German ethnic groups equally in order to
remove potential biases resulting from the larger number of applicants of
Turkish origin, as well as the smaller variations in sample size across the
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other groups. These results do not deviate in any substantively important
way either (see Table S6).
. Next, we further scrutinized the result that group-level value distance
trumps education levels by splitting the sample in half in three different
ways: male versus female applicants; jobs with low and high customer
contact; and jobs with a lower and a higher required level of schooling.
In each of the six regressions, the magnitude of the group-level coefficients
remains virtually unchanged and value distance largely absorbs the ethni-
city effect (see Table S7).
. We also considered other indicators of productivity, namely the average
unemployment rates and occupational status of groups. The alternative
productivity indicators explain the pattern of discrimination more or less
equally well as value distance. This implies that we cannot reject statistical
discrimination explanations with certainty. Nevertheless, the evidence we
present for taste discrimination is stronger because it is based on an indi-
cator – value distance – that is independent of labour-market outcomes,
and because our statistical discrimination indicator that is less strongly
plagued by problems of reverse causality – education levels – performs
poorly in comparison (see Table S8).
. In a final step, we tested an alternative model that instead draws on pro-
ductivity information on the individual level. In Table S10, we added inter-
action terms between grades and ethnicity, phenotype and religion,
respectively, to our main model. None of the interaction terms had a signifi-
cant coefficient. This suggests that while employers generally value pro-
ductivity information, majority and minority members benefit equally
from better grades.
Discussion and conclusions
By employing a novel research design that allowed comparing the impact on
labour-market discrimination of various ethnic, racial and religious signals sim-
ultaneously, we have shed light both on the relative importance of these
signals, and on the key theoretical question whether discrimination is
driven by statistical or taste considerations. Like many previous studies,
ours reveals significant discrimination against minority applicants. However,
this discrimination does not affect all minority groups equally and some of
them not at all. While we found strong discrimination against Muslims,
there was no significant bias against Buddhists or Hindus. While blacks
were significantly discriminated against, this was much less the case for
Asian applicants.
We identified taste-based discrimination against minority groups with
values that differ strongly from the German value pattern as the most
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important factor explaining these differences. Once value distance is con-
sidered, we no longer find statistically significant penalties against applicants
with non-German ethnic origins, non-white phenotypes and non-Christian
religiosity. This result indicates that there is no significant discrimination
against minorities that are culturally proximate to Germans. This accounts
for the high positive callback rates of groups of West European, South Euro-
pean and US American origin, but also of those of East Asian origin, who all
have value patterns close to Germany’s. The value patterns of Sub-Saharan
African and Muslim groups are the most distant from Germans and they are
also found at the bottom of the callback ranking.
While positive callback was also correlated with mean group levels of edu-
cation, our indicator of statistical discrimination, this variable could not
account for most of the group differences in callback and its effect was
much reduced and became statistically insignificant when value distance
was considered simultaneously. Once we control for value distance, we no
longer observe significant ethnic, phenotypical and religious penalties.
Value distance thus offers a satisfactory explanation for the patterns of dis-
crimination found in the data.
Our results suggest that employers’ decisions are sensitive to group stereo-
types regarding attitudes towards freedom, autonomy and gender equality.
This is in line with Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2016) who report that French
employers referred to conflicts related to such values – e.g. over relations
with co-workers of the opposite sex – when asked about reasons behind dis-
crimination against Muslims. Whether employers’ reference to social values is
purely a matter of taste or whether it is also related to actual productivity con-
cerns relating to cultural conflicts on the job cannot be answered with our
research design. Even if value concerns can have a basis in empirical fact
on the level of the average social values of groups, it goes without saying
that discrimination against individuals because of assumptions about the
average traits of the groups they belong to is unethical and, in most countries,
illegal. However, the more subtle forms of taste discrimination that our results
reveal may be more difficult to identify and combat than crude taste discrimi-
nation based on ethnicity, race, or religion per se.
Culture and values would be a good starting point for future research to
investigate employer rationales behind discrimination. We hope to inspire
others to use the kind of multiple-group design that we have employed to
answer the question to what extent these results generalize beyond
Germany. Application materials in Germany are extremely detailed and
include copies of all relevant certificates and diplomas. Given this rich individ-
ual information, there may be less need for German employers to rely on
group-level indicators of productivity than in other countries (similarly
Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016). The relative importance of racial and religious
signals may also differ in other contexts, and ethnic hierarchies in other
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immigration countries may deviate from those in Germany. Race could, for
instance, be a more salient signal in countries with a history of slavery and
colonialism, whereas the weight of religious signals might be related to the
salience of debates on Islam in the European context.
Notes
1. For a few small ethnic groups, no separate entries are available in the Mikrozen-
sus and their values had to be approximated by those of larger geographical cat-
egories. For instance, the Egyptian values are taken from the grouping “Egypt,
Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia”. Of course, these are rough approximations, but
this data are the most detailed data that are available in Germany.
2. In the main analyses we focus on average education levels. However, we con-
sider groups’ average unemployment rate and occupational status (ISEI) as
alternative indicators of productivity. We have chosen not to use these alterna-
tive indicators for our main analysis because unemployment rates and occu-
pational status may themselves be a result of labor market discrimination and
therefore the direction of causality is unclear. Online Supplement Table S8
shows the results of analyses with these alternative indicators.
3. Country-averages provide imperfect estimates for cultural values among
different immigrant groups, but they are the best proxies that we are aware
of. Country-averages of cultural values may differ from employer stereotypes
about immigrant groups, for example, in consequence of self-selection into
migration (Chiswick 1999) or value changes after migration (Lönnqvist, Jasins-
kaja-Lahti, and Verkasalo 2011).
4. Greeks receive the same values as their neighbors, the Macedonians, because
the value surveys provide no information about Greeks.
5. Information about the prevalence of different religious groups across countries
is provided by the Pew research center (http://www.pewforum.org/).
6. Some countries, especially in Central and South America, are difficult to classify
because most of the population is of mixed race. We have left these countries
out of the calculation of the phenotype average scores. The boundary
between predominantly white and predominantly Asian phenotypes (which
we draw between Iran and Pakistan) is to some extent arbitrary, but results
are robust to alternative specifications. The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa
are designated as those with a predominantly black phenotype.
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